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Covenant, Justicies Writs, and 
Reasonable Showings 
by RoBERT C. PALMER* 
In 1982, I presented a complex argument interrelating the history 
of debt, detinue, covenant, and trespass; it treated the provision of 
the justicies writs for county court cases, the development of the 
forty shilling rule in county debt/detinue, and the rule requiring 
specialty in covenant in the king's court.' The thesis was original 
along many lines and has met, expectedly, a certain amount of 
scepticism. Paul Brand, in a brief review, only noted that it was 
unconvincing. 2 Joseph Biancalana, in both a short review3 and in a 
lengthy review essay, 4 completely dismissed the argument, arguing 
at length and in detail a different development, both for the origins of 
the justicies writs and for the covenant rule. More recently, David J. 
Ibbetson has asserted that the thesis could not bear close examina-
tion; he proposed an origin to the covenant rule in Roman law. 5 The 
detailed alternatives presented by Biancalana and Ibbetson necessi-
tate a similarly detailed response. Having considered these written 
and other informal comments, and with further data, my conclusion 
is that the criticisms are unfounded, and not simply a different, 
legitimate approach. 
The specific legal changes at issue here, together with the wider 
implications about the nature of legal development in thirteenth-
century England, likewise justify very careful consideration of the 
*Adler fellow, College of William and Mary, Marshall Wythe School of Law. 
I. R. C. Palmer, The County Courts of Medieval England, 1/50-1350, 174-262 
(1982). In preparation of this article I am heavily indebted, as always, to Dr. Paul 
Brand, who examined several copies of the tract "Exceptiones contra brevia" in the 
British Library for me. 
2. Brand, Book Review, 99 Law Q. Rev. 159 (1983). 
3. Biancalana, Book Review, I Law & Hist. Rev. 313 (1983) (hereinafter Bianca-
lana, Book Review). 
4. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts: A Review Essay (Book Review), 52 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 994 (1983) (hereinafter Biancalana, Medieval County Courts). I find the 
critical comments Biancalana makes about the first half of the book to be unfounded, 
based on a superficial reading, as are those that concern chapters 7 and 8. That 
material, less complicated and more open to historians, can stand more easily on its 
own and is outside the scope of the present subject. 
5. Ibbetson, Words and Deeds: The Action of Covenant in the Reign of Edward I 4 
Law & Hist. Rev. 71 (1986). 
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issues. The legal changes not only determined the nature of lesser 
jurisdictions in England, but also dictated that covenant would grow 
rapidly obsolete, so that the later history of contracts grew rather 
out of assumpsit. My analysis suggested that the justicies writs 
were provided to route simple cases out of the king's court into the 
county courts without litigants thereby losing particularly advanta-
geous royal procedures. Biancalana sees their provision as aimed at 
controlling county courts and providing revenue. As will become 
apparent, this is in effect an attempt to revive the once useful but 
now outdated approach to English legal history associated with 
Maitland's work. At all points, the matter deserves attention. 
The specialty rule in covenant raises similarly important prob-
lems. My explanation was that royal justices became accustomed to 
adjudicating covenant actions under justicies writs of covenant re-
moved into the king's court; since those writs always had plaintiffs 
with specialty, the justices eventually elevated that happenstance 
into an evidentiary rule. Biancalana suggests that the specialty rule 
arose simultaneously in county and king's court because of the 
growing literacy of society. His alternative avoids facing the prob-
lem of why and how the rule appeared; it uses social history to avoid 
legal analysis. Ibbetson's alternative, deriving the rule as an out-
growth of a borrowing from Roman law, is far worse, however. 
Resorting to Roman law for the source of English common law rules 
should be greeted with great scepticism, not because it could not 
have happened, but because borrowing from Roman law has so 
often served as an easy all-purpose explanation. Once again, it is an 
approach that, unless all other avenues are first pursued, discour-
ages close evaluation of the sources. However, any successful 
showing of such a relationship between the common law and Roman 
law at a point as major as the specialty rule in covenant would be 
important; Ibbetson's argument deserves close attention. As I shall 
show, the objections and alternatives proposed by Biancalana and 
lbbetson are devoid of merit. 
Not even the additional evidence I have obtained, however, will 
satisfy those who demand massive, direct, and irrefutable proof. 
Such clear evidence is unavailable for certain parts of the thesis: 
very little documentation has survived for medieval county courts. 6 
Nevertheless, there is still so much evidence to support the thesis 
that one cannot revert to traditional explanations. This thesis, not 
absolutely proved but far stronger than its critics have realized, 
should stand until a more explanatory argument replaces it. 
6. Palmer, supra note I, at 225-26; Palmer, County Year Book Reports: The Pro-
fessional Lawyer in the Medieval County Court, 91 Eng. Hist. Rev. 776 (1976). 
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I. The lbbetsoii Thesis on the Covenant Rule 
David Ibbetson, having rejected the various current theories 
about the reason for the requirement of specialty in covenant, posits 
a borrowing from Roman law that was then progressively expanded 
to cover all cases in covenant. Not only is his criticism of my thesis 
unfounded, but his alternative is untenable. Still, his examination of 
the problem can lead to an interesting examination of covenant in 
the reign of Edward I that would, without explication, otherwise be 
lost in the rejection of his article as a whole. 
lbbetson adduces two reasons why my thesis about the cov-
enant rule "does not bear close examination." 7 The first is that it is 
hard to believe that county courts in mid-thirteenth century England 
refused to hear convenant cases not supported by specialty. 8 The 
statement is completely true. County courts almost certainly heard 
cases of covenant not supported by specialty, both in the mid-
thirteenth century and throughout the fourteenth century. However, 
my argument was that there was a distinction between cases brought 
by plaint and cases brought by justicies writ. Litigants without spe-
cialty would bring covenant cases in county by plaint; purchase of 
the justicies writ of covenant presupposed written proof. The spe-
cialty rule in county court "relied on a specific writ form" 9 and had 
no bearing whatsoever on cases brought by plaint. lbbetson's first 
reason for rejecting my thesis is thus based on a misreading. 
His second reason is related to the first and is equally un-
founded. He considers it implausible that justices "would confuse 
the rule applying in the county with the rules to be applied in the 
royal courts." 10 The rule, however, was not a county court rule. If 
anything, it originated in Chancery, which issued the justicies writs. 
The rule attached to the writ, not to the jurisdiction; when such a 
writ was removed into Bench, the rule still applied. The effect on the 
justices, moreover, is quite believable. Many of the actions of cov-
enant brought by precipe originally into the king's court were non-
litigious: they began the process by which the parties recorded land 
settlements in final concords. 11 Justicies writs removed into the 
7. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 80. 
8. /d. 
9. Palmer, supra note I, at 209. 
10. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 80. 
II. To make a final concord, one could bring either a writ of warranty of charters 
or a writ of covenant. One yearbook note stipulates that warranty of charters is 
brought for a gift ("doun"), whereas covenant is brought for a render ("rendre"). 
The original writ determined the binding quality of the fine. A final concord based on 
a writ of warranty of charters could be defeated in two ways: by denying that the deed 
on which the action was based was followed by seisin or by showing that the deed 
was different from the fine. Such a final concord only bound those privy to it. A final 
concord based on a writ of covenant, however, could be denied only by showing that 
the court had been deceived; moreover, it bound both those privy and also strangers. 
British Library Add. MS. 31826 fol. 226. 
100 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XXXI 
king's court, however, would usually be litigious; the court would 
have had trouble relating the possession of specialty to the form of 
the writ once the forty shilling rule in debt/detinue had destroyed 
the original meaning of the same phrase in those more common 
justicies writs. 12 It would seem completely plausible that the regular 
appearance of plaintiffs with specialty in covenant before royal jus-
tices should influence the way in which those justices thought about 
covenant. The question ought not relate to plausibility, but to 
whether that was the decisive influence. At any rate, Ibbetson's 
rejection of the thesis was not based on the merits, but on a superfi-
cial and incorrect reading. 
The validity of lbbetson's alternative, however, does not rest 
on the accuracy of his criticisms of other approaches. He suggests a 
three-stage development for the specialty rule in covenant. The first 
stage was the application of the rule to actions brought on leases, 
and this application was a borrowing from Roman law. The second 
stage was the expansive application of the rule to actions of cov-
enant brought for non-performance of agreements. The third stage 
was the application of the rule to covenant in all situations. His 
alternative is severely flawed at every point. 
Ibbetson bases his first stage solely on the tract Exceptiones 
contra brevia, and especially with three of the exceptions that could 
be taken to a writ of covenant, which he dates at around 1280.13 Each 
must be treated separately. He renders one of those exceptions "If a 
writing has been produced in an action of covenant, he cannot claim 
that he is not required to answer this writ or count. '' 14 He infers that 
thus specialty was not always necessary, since the exception sup-
poses a limited class of covenant actions in which specialty is pro-
duced, not all actions. 15 However, his paraphrase of this exception 
is inaccurate. The exception is rendered accurately "Likewise, if 
anyone has view of the writing of the covenant, he cannot object 
that he is not held to answer such a writ or count." 16 No inference 
about the specialty rule can be made from this exception. The point 
is completely procedural. Once the defendant has asked for and 
received view of the specialty (without indicating whether specialty 
will always be present or not), he cannot resort to pleading that he is 
12. Palmer, supra note I, at 258-61. 
13. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 81-82. 
14. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 82. 
15. Id. 
16. Ibbetson includes the Latin version: ''Item si quis habet visum scripti de 
convencione non potest dedicere ei quod non tenetur respondere tali brevi vel 
narracioni." !d. at 82 n. 61. An alternative version derives from British Library Add. 
MS. 18600, fT. 177-177fv; it is not significantly different: "Item cum quis habuit visum 
scripti in brevi de convencione. non pot est dedicere quin teneatur respondere tali 
brevi vel narracioni." 
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not held to answer: rather, he must challenge a variance between the 
writ and count and the specialty or else answer specifically to the 
specialty. That order of pleading is observable in several casesY 
The next exception lbbetson renders "He can ask what he has 
of the covenant, and if he has nothing he can ask for judgment.'' 18 
The rendition is accurate, and he quite rightly notes that this is the 
same kind of exception used in debt which did not preclude claims 
supported only by suit. We both conclude that that exception is not 
sufficiently specific to indicate anything about whether or not there 
was a specialty rule. 
An exception not treated by lbbetson here becomes relevant. 
The exception is "Likewise, he can ask judgment inasmuch as he 
alleges a special deed or contract and has only the countryside.'' 19 It 
could mean that when one alleges a special deed, or contract, in-
deed, any simple transaction, one cannot simply aver by jury but 
must have either the specialty or suit, respectively. This exception 
would then indicate that not all covenants were enforceable only if 
there was specialty. Special, however, could be read distributively, 
as referring to special deeds or special contracts, so that the excep-
tion relates to special provisions beyond the basic agreement. 20 This 
exception would not be relevant to the general specialty rule in 
covenant, but it might well indicate a more limited rule. 21 It is puz-
17. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 139 (Neumarch v. Thornton: exception as 
to whether plaintiff should be answerable by such a writ, after which view of the deed 
was asked); British Library Add MS. 37657 fol. 30 (Keyser v. Crescy: defendant first 
challenged the count, then waived that exception and alleged variance between writ 
and specialty); British Library Add. MS. 31826fv. 345 (John v. Rokele: challenge as 
to whether plaintiff should be answered with such writ and count, followed thereafter 
by asking what he had of the covenant); Y.B. Pas. 21 Edw. I, 2, Year Books of the 
Reign of King Edward /, 23 (Rolls Series, A.J. Horwood ed., 1863-79) (A v. B: 
defendant forced to answer to the deed after view instead of challenging the writ, 
although complicated by the issue that distraint was possible). 
18. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 82 (Ad breve de convencione potest dicere quid 
habet de convencione et si nichil habet pet ere judicium." The version in British 
Library Add. MS. 18600, f. 177f-fv is not significantly different.) 
19. British Library Add. MS. 18600, f. 177-177v.: Item potest petijudicium ex quo 
aile gat speciale factum vel contractum et nichil habet nisi patriam.'' The versions in 
British Library Harley 1208, f. 132v.; British Library Harley 1120, fv. 152; and British 
Library Lansdowne 467, fv. 176 have only minor differences. A different manuscript 
merges this exception with the previous one: "Potest dici quid habet de convencione 
et si nichil habeat potest petere judicium desicut a/legat speciale factum vel 
contractum et nichil habet nisi patriam." British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 303. 
That manuscript thus lists only five instead of the standard six exceptions for 
covenant. 
20. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
21. I think the idea that such a rule was simply applied more broadly, without 
further explanation, is inadequate. The difference between the fact of the agreement 
and further clauses added on to it is an important one, given the origins ofthe writ of 
covenant that I am explicating in another article. It would require a substantial 
change in approach. The existence of this limited rule, however, would have made it 
more easy for the influence of the justicies writ that I argue to operate. 
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zling that lbbetson chose not to treat this exception, despite its 
obvious relevance. 
The third exception lbbetson treats refers to leases and is cen-
tral to his thesis: "He can ask for judgment if he counts for a certain 
term and this certain term is not put in writing. " 22 Several meanings 
are possible; he has chosen the least likely. He reads terminus 
(term) to mean lease, not a specific word of the agreement or the 
length of the lease. Accepting that for the moment, certus terminus 
non ponitur in scripto could mean, as he says, that the lease was not 
written down at all and thus was not enforceable. 23 It could also 
mean that the particular term or duration of the lease, the certain 
term was not put in the writing: that the specialty proffered talked 
about a lease without mentioning the duration of the lease, whereas 
his count specified a certain term. A third meaning, which overlaps 
with the second, is that certus terminus actually does mean specific 
word. 24 There would thus be a difference between a specific part of 
the contract alleged and the wording of the specialty. Finally, it 
could mean that there is a difference between the existence of a 
lease and specific details of a lease; specific details had to be in 
writing. 25 Of these, lbbetson's choice is the least likely, because it 
does not explain why the exception talks about certus terminus 
instead of merely terminus. lbbetson's sole adduced proof for the 
existence of a specialty rule in covenant limited to leases around 
1280 indicates nothing of the kind. 
His derivation of the rule from Roman law is also flawed. I have 
no pretensions to knowledge of Roman law, but his choice of the 
Roman emphyteusis over the locatio rei, on his own description, as 
the appropriate analogy for the English leasehold seems particularly 
inappropriate. The emphyteusis was "the holding of land on a he-
reditary basis either for a fixed term or in perpetuity in exchange for 
22. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 82. 
23. /d. 
24. lbbetson dismisses this possibility by saying that the exception would no 
longer make sense, "especially as the courts might be willing to allow the pleading of 
parol terms in actions brought on written agreements." lbbetson, supra note 5, at 82 
n. 63. The two cases he cites are irrelevant. One is an assize of mort dancestor, in 
which deeds were treated very differently from in other actions. The other is an 
action of debt for money given by reason of a marriage; such agreements always 
caused unusual problems. Palmer, Contexts of Marriage in Medieval England: Evi-
dence from the King's Court circa 1300, 59 Speculum 42 (1984). 
An exception analogous to the one envisaged here is an action of debt that arose 
from a broken covenant. The exception was that the deed did· not specify a certain 
day for the performance. Mohaut v. Boys, British Library Add. MS. 35116 fol. 240. 
25. lbbetson notes that actions of covenant of lessee against lessor to regain the 
term after lessee was ousted by lessor did not seem to require specialty. lbbetson, 
supra note 5, at 92. This would be a case in which the mere fact of the lease was at 
issue, as distinct from specific terms. 
1987 COVENANT. JUSTICIES WRITS, AND REASONABLE SHOWINGS 103 
the payment of rent. " 26 The English leasehold, unlike the emphyteu-
sis, was not hereditary: it was a chattel that went to executors. The 
seemingly proprietary aspects of leasehold in the treatises lbbetson 
cites are always carefully circumscribed. If there is an English anal-
ogy to the emphyteusis, it would seem to be the fee farm, as 
lbbetson's citations might well indicate. 27 That analogy is often 
made. 28 The appropriate analogue to the normal English lease would 
be the locatio rei, the bailing or letting of a thing in return for 
compensation. The analogy on whiCh his argument rests is faulty. 
Moreover, even if the civil law emphyteusis influenced the English 
lease despite the lack of a close analogy, it leaves as an anomaly one 
of Ibbetson's findings: that a lessee's suit in covenant against his 
lessor to recover after the lessor ejected him seems not to have 
required the lessee to support his suit with specialty. 29 There is 
literally nothing that remains of lbbetson' s first stage ofthe deyelop-
ment of the specialty rule in covenant. 
The second stage (the first extension of the rule) requires simi-
larly close attention. lbbetson adduces three reports to indicate the 
specialty rule between 1292 and 1304. There is no apparent exten-
sion beyond what can be perceived in the Exceptiones contra 
brevia. 
Corbett v. Mercury 30 is a well-known case from the eyre of 
Shropshire of 1292. It has been assumed that its two reports, one 
indicating a plaint of debt and the other a plaint of covenant, were 
widely divergent reports of the same case.31 It seems, rather, that 
there were two different cases between the same parties and based 
· on the same factual situation: a plaint of debt reported twice32 and a 
plaint of covenant reported once.33 The plaint of debt went to the 
jury. The report of the plaint of covenant ended on an exception that 
the plaintiff ought not be answered unless he could produce a writ-
ing. The report itself does not indicate that this exception was suc-
cessful, except that it terminated at that point. It is unlikely that both 
26. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 83. 
27. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 83 n. 67. 
28. Black's Law Dictionary 554 (5th ed. 1979). 
29. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 92. 
30. I Y.B. 20 Edw. I, supra note 17, at 222, 487. 
31. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 87-88 (here only following the normal treatment of 
the case). 
32. I Y.B. 20 Edw. I, supra note 17 at 222, 487. The former reference is on the 
same page as the plaint of covenant and is described as based on a writ of debt. The 
exception taken, however, concerns the lack of a writ: it is certainly a plaint of debt. 
Moreover, both reports of the debt plaint concern 20 shillings, retail the same inap-
propriate 40 shilling limitation exception, and have the same pleaders in the same 
relationship. 
33. /d. at i, 223. 
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suits were allowed to continue, and it is at least possible that the 
plaintiff realized that his suit was weak without specialty. He ap-
peared against another defendant claiming an obligatory writing; 
that suit failed. 34 He could have been suing to recover a deed that 
had been put into the hands of a trusted third party. The failure of 
that plea would reinforce the possibility that the exception as to lack 
of specialty was successful. If so, however, the exception can only 
be construed as that found in Exceptiones contra brevia: that if 
certain terms, and not the mere existence of an agreement, are al-
leged, they have to be put in writing. The issue in this case did 
involve a special agreement in addition to the lease of a horse. 
The second case concerned a lease for 10 years with the stipula-
tion of free ingress and egress. The report mirrors the alternative 
version of one of the covenant exceptions in Exceptiones contra 
brevia: "Likewise, one can ask judgment inasmuch as he alleges a 
special deed or contract and has only the countryside. " 35 In this 
case the defendant, asked what he had to show, responded that he 
was ready to verify per sectam patrie (by suit of the countryside). 36 
The inclusion of sectam was probably a mistake; the context sup-
ports the interpretation that he wanted merely to rely on a jury 
verdict, as the tract would suppose. The defendant then, in accord 
with the tract, asked judgement if "without a special deed attesting 
the abovesaid covenant he ought to be answered. " 37 The exception 
was successful. The need for the special deed probably relates to the 
ingress and egress stipulation. The close following of Exceptiones 
contra brevium would not indicate any broadening. 
The third case is perplexing, but shows no alteration in the rules 
pertinent to covenant. The lessor had leased to the lessee for two 
years; lessee was supposed to have made a writing that he would not 
hold over. Lessee did not make the writing, but did hold over for a 
further eight years. Defendant first argued that, since the writing 
was not made, the covenant was not made. This line of thought 
presupposes that two covenants were involved: the lease itself and a 
different covenant not to hold over. Lessor's response confirmed 
this conceptualization, isolating the holding over as the cause of the 
34. /d. at i, 284. 
35. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21. 
36. British Library Add. MS. 5925 fol. 162 (Mich. 31 Edw. I)("Et unde idem Adam 
[de P. capellanus] dicit quod cum predictus W. [Pistor] dimisit ei predictum 
tenementum usque ad finem x. annorum etc. cum Iibera ingressu et egressu ad 
eundem. [W. Pistor:] si quid habeat de convencione. Et A dicit quod per sectam 
patrie paratus est predictam convencionem verificare. Et predictus W. petit judicium 
asque facto speciali predictam conventionem atestante responderi debeat per quod 
factum predictum W. sibi faceret responsalem in hac parte. Consideratur quod 
predictus W. inde sine die.") 
37. /d. 
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action. Indeed, such a covenant against holding over could be distin-
guished from ingress and egress clauses, dates of performance, or 
the number of years involved in the lease, because it took effect only 
after the term expired and was thus not strictly appurtenant to the 
lease. Lessee's initial response failed, whereupon lessor was asked 
to show what he had of the covenant, whereupon he offered to aver 
by a jury. Lessee responded with an exception that sounds directly 
on point: "Covenant falls naturally in specialty, and of this you 
show nothing; judgment. " 38 The exception was unsuccessful. I take 
the exception at something less than face value, as a variant on the 
exception to a special deed or contract supported only by the tender 
of a jury. It did not work here, apparently, because the hold over 
covenant was a separate covenant from the lease. It turned out that 
lessee claimed a free tenement adjudged him by an assize of novel 
disseisin. For the second stage, then, nothing that Ibbetson adduces 
shows any need for specialty in covenant as such, except when 
special clauses were alleged. 39 
Ibbetson's concluding section details those areas in which cov-
enant at the end of the reign of Edward I continued to be brought 
without specialty. He groups them in the category of "covenant for 
wrongs. " 4° For him the most prominent area involves lessees who 
commit waste, but this category also includes what might be consid-
ered the main area for covenant: remedy for the lessee against a 
lessor who deprived him of the lease during the term. By the 1330s, 
however, all covenant cases in the king's court required specialty. 41 
Since the only specialty rule thus far observed prior to 1320 relates 
to special clauses, this once again centers attention on what hap-
pened in the Waltham Carrier Case. 42 Ibbetson forwards scholar-
ship by bringing these cases into discussion, but he fails both to 
recognize the rule about special clauses and to explain the origins of 
the specialty rule in covenant generally. 
38. 5 Y.B. Pasc. 32 Edw. I, supra note 17 at 200-201. 
39. Those who like to see Roman law importations will refer to lbbetson's footnote 
64, to find that John Bassianus had a similar idea. The similarity should not be 
automatically taken to prove a borrowing. In passing it should be noted that 
Ibbetsons's perception of a shift from the substance ofthe agreement to the fact of the 
agreement as perceived in venue rules is faulty, being anchored in a case concerning 
Scottish lands and having strong parallels in other personal actions. 
40. Ibbetson does not show how he distinguishes between committing waste on the 
one hand and damaging a horse or holding over on the other. It would seem that all 
could be considered "covenant for wrongs." 
41. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 93. 
42. The Eyre of London, /4 Edward II, A.D. /32/, Part ii, 86 Selden Soc. 286 
(Helen M. Cam, ed., 1969). 
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II. The Biancalana Thesis on Justicies Writs 
Biancalana tried to dismantle the justicies writ thesis as thor-
oughly as I have tried to do this to Ibbetson's thesis on covenant. I 
argued that most of the justicies writs (most prominently, viscontiel 
writs of debt/ detinue and covenant) presupposed a plaintiff that had 
a showing of a higher nature than suit, normally specialty. Those 
writs were provided to relegate routine cases to the county courts, 
and for that purpose the writs provided plaintiffs with the advanta-
geous force given specialty in the king's court, but now to be applied 
in county courts when the suit was brought by writ. "Palmer," he 
says, "is almost certainly wrong in his argument about the justicies 
writ of debt.' '43 He much prefers to read the evidence as showing the 
justicies writs as a mechanism that "extended royal control over 
county courts and facilitated the collection of royal revenue. " 44 
Biancalana's suggestion shows the remarkable vitality of Mait-
land's approach to twelfth and thirteenth century English legal his-
tory. That tradition views the maxim "no man need answer for his 
free tenement without a royal writ" precisely as a mechanism for 
licensing and thus controlling pleas of land in feudal courts and as a 
source of revenue. That approach to Angevin legal development has 
proven bankrupt. 45 From a completely a priori perspective then, 
Biancalana's approach would seem improbable, as based on a faulty 
perception of Angevin legal change. Having put Biancalana in an 
historiographical context, however, does not show that he is wrong; 
it only shows that evaluating his analysis is important for determin-
ing the overall nature of the origins of English common law. 
On a crucially important point Biancalana and I worked on 
different assumptions, assumptions that seemed so obvious as not to 
need proof and really not to need explication. I worked on the as-
sumption that county courts had jurisdiction in debt/detinue and 
covenant by plaint, so that the introduction of justicies writs after 
around 1200 was in addition to that continuing jurisdiction by plaint. 
Litigants thus had a choice as to whether or not to buy a writ until 
the 1290s, at which time writs became available that prohibited debt/ 
detinue plaints for forty shillings or more in the lower courts. 
Biancalana started from the opposite assumption: that the plaint 
jurisdiction in debt/ detinue and covenant in county courts ended 
with the provision of the justicies writs. Litigants thus would have 
43. Biancalana, Book Review, supra note 3, at 315. 
44. /d. 
45. S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism (1976); Palmer, 
The Economic and Cultural Impact of the Origins of Property, 3 Law & Hist. Rev. 
375 (1985); Palmer, The Feudal Framework of English Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1130 
(1981); Palmer, The Origins of Property in England, 3 Law & Hist. Rev. I (1985). 
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had no choice at all. It was from this perspective that he read the 
book, and only toward the end of his discussion of the justicies writ 
of debt does he consider my working assumption: "Palmer's argu-
ment would be more convincing if we knew that a plaintiff in, for 
example, a case of debt was required to begin his suit with ajusticies 
writ. For if he were not so required, he could begin by plaint and 
thereby avoid the requirement of a charter.' ' 46 My assumption can at 
least be established as probable, and Biancalana's caveats and sug-
gestions as mistaken. 
Little doubt can exist that litigants did not need to purchase a 
justicies writ to bring cases in county courts throughout most of the 
thirteenth century. The best quantitative evidence we have would 
indicate that in 1330, only 10% of the cases in county court were 
brought by writY Working backwards, the requirement of a writ in 
county court for debt/detinue cases claiming forty shillings or more 
originated in the 1290s. Biancalana thought that the date was uncer-
tain48 and cited John Beckerman's article, without reference to the 
additional information contained in County Courts. 49 It is difficult to 
see how the date can be uncertain when the first writ of prohibition 
of forty shilling plaints in debt/detinue was issued in 129550, lower 
court plaint cases in debt/detinue for thirty-nine shillings 11 pence 
(the typical way to avoid the forty shilling requirement) appeared 
only in 129251 , and the first formulation of a rule (although a rule not 
yet enforceable by prohibition or, as far as I can find, by false 
judgment) was in 1286.52 Moreover, I documented plaints of debt/ 
detinue in county courts from early in the reign of Edward I, none of 
which were challenged on jurisdictional grounds. 53 The use of the 
writ recordari for the removal of such plaints in 1275 would have 
sufficiently indicated the existence of such plaints.54 There is no 
basis at all for thinking that county jurisdiction over plaints in debt/ 
detinue was limited prior to the 1280s; there is much documentation 
showing that the rule arose and became enforceable in the years 
1281 to 1295. Biancalana completely compartmentalized my treat-
ment of the forty shilling rule when he wrote on the justicies writs, 
46. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1012. 
47. Palmer, supra note I, at 226. 
48. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1012. 
49. J. Beckerman, The Forty-Shilling Jurisdictional Limit in Medieval English 
Personal Actions, in Leg. Hi st. Stud. 1972 110 (D. Jenkins ed. 1975). 
50. Palmer, supra note I, at 257. 
51. ld. at 254. 
52. ld. at 255. 
53. /d. at 253. 
54. Jd. at 250. 
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and did not go back to revise those views when he later analyzed my 
treatment of the rule.55 
One can confidently assert that significant plaints in debt/ 
detinue appeared in. county courts in the 1270s; we can be equally 
confident about the earlier thirteenth century. Prior to the justicies 
writs, in the twelfth century, there was debt litigation in the county 
courts. 56 The provision of the justicies writs did not result in the 
massive issuance of such writs, as would have occurred had the 
writs been required for all debt litigation. 57 Moreover, if there was 
some point early in the thirteenth century whenjusticies writs were 
made mandatory for all debt/detinue litigation in county courts, that 
decision has left no trace. Finally, that decision would have had to 
have been reversed at some point prior to the reign of Edward I to 
account for the jurisdiction documentable at that time; the undocu-
mented reversal of an undocumented royal position in such an im-
portant matter is extremely implausible. Any assertion that justicies 
writs were forced on all county litigants in debt/detinue in the early 
thirteenth century must be met with extreme scepticism. Bianca-
lana's assumption about the requirement for the justicies and the 
consequent proposed motivation for licensing and control must 
therefore be dismissed; all of the documentation and almost all of 
the argument necessary for this dismissal appear in the book he was 
reviewing. 
This mistaken assumption undermines the rest of Biancalana's 
analysis of the justicies writ of debt. He thought it improbable in the 
early thirteenth century, under men such as Hubert Walter, to allow 
enforcement of debts only if they were evidenced with specialty and 
that such a requirement was more reasonable late in the thirteenth 
century when literacy was higher. 58 However, such a requirement 
was improbable anytime in medieval England. The justicies writs 
did not force people to change their practices, because there was no 
necessity to purchase the writ to enforce the debt. Prior to the 1280s 
they could always resort to the plaint jurisdiction of the counties; 
thereafter, they could get a justicies writ even if they did not have 
specialty. Litigants without specialty always had some option. 
The financial motivation Biancalana adduces is groundless. He 
thought that the writ ''facilitated collection of the third part of a debt 
owed to the king when a debt was collected with the king's proc-
ess. " 59 There was no facilitation: the third part was only due if the 
55. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, a 1014-15. 
56. Palmer, supra note I, at 184. 
57. /d. at 186-87. 
58. Biancalana, Book Review, supra note 3, at 315; Biancalana, Medieval County 
Courts, supra note 4, at 1009-10. 
59. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1008. 
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debt enforcement began with a royal writ. Biancalana thought that 
the Rotuli de Oblatis highlighted the financial importance of the 
writs.60 On the contrary, they merely noted the few payments prom-
ised. Whether these payments are viewed as motive or welcome 
result depends on the reader's judgment. Those who imagine that 
the writs were provided merely as a very clever gimmick to increase 
revenue underestimate Angevin government and fail to put the 
records in proper perspective. 
The question comes into better perspective when one realizes 
that litigants did not have to purchase the writs. The pressing ques-
tion then becomes why they were willing to surrender a third (or a 
half, quarter, sixth or tenth) of the debt to the king to have a writ. 
Litigants would not part with their money simply to gain the experi-
ence of going into Chancery or to impress the sheriff with their 
diligence; there had to be some benefit that made the origination of 
the suit by writ particularly desirable. Isolating that reason was the 
purpose behind sorting through the possibilities that the justicies 
writs were manu-militari collection devices or constituted the sher-
iff as ajustice. 61 Biancalana viewed that exercise as wrong-headed,62 
but both those theories, had they been possible, would have pro-
vided the motivation for litigants to purchase the writs. Once those 
were excluded, it remained possible that the writs provided jury 
procedure, a desirable matter for plaintiffs as compared to defend-
ant's compurgation; but that seems to have ,been a matter that grew 
up later in the century. 63 Finally, the possibility of removal to the 
king's court could have been a motivation for litigants, except that 
that motivation is not believable until later in the century.64 
It is the exclusion of all other possible motivations for the writs, 
including Biancalana's suggestion of control and revenue, that raises 
the possibility that the justicies writs were provided to keep certain 
kinds of cases from clogging the king's court by making the writ 
demand the better procedure of the king's court for the individual 
case in county court. If the procedure was not trial by jury, nor 
access to removal by pone, nor the constitution of a friendly sheriff 
as justice, nor mere executive collection of the debt the remaining 
possibilities are not numerous. Those possibilities excluded, and 
obscurantism being undesirable, it remains to find that possibility 
that the evidence does tend to support. That the form of the writ was 
related to its effect and motivation is not improbable. The word 
60. /d. at 1009. 
61. Palmer, supra note I, at 187-98. 
62. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1006-08. 
63. Palmer, supra note I, at 215-16. 
64. /d. at 217-18. 
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justicies having been eliminated as the decisive element, there only 
remain the words 'as he shall reasonably have been able to show': 
sicut rationabiliter monstrare poterit. 
Biancalana raises several objections to my construction of the 
reasonable showing clause; none are well conceived. Biancalana 
notes, as did !,65 that there were two justicies writs in Glanvi/1, 66 
although he does not note that the book already handles his objec-
tions. Start with the facias writ for enforcing testamentary bequests. 
Biancalana objects that such writs would not demand the plaintiff to 
have written proof, because a donor's death-bed gift did not have to 
be written. 67 That criticism assumes that the writ would apply to all 
potential litigants under a bequest; that it was a general remedy for 
testamentary bequests. The commentary in Glanvill indicates that it 
was not appropriate when the will was not rightly made (testamen-
tum non fuerit recte factum) or when it was disputed whether the 
thing claimed was thus devised. 68 The writ was thus appropriate 
only for the very clear cases, as when, one might suppose, the 
testamentum was written; otherwise it went to the ecclesiastical 
courts. 69 Nevertheless, this was a facias, not a justicies writ and 
looked to more executive action, as simply to make the division of 
the chattels in a judicial setting. Then, as to the writ for delivering 
chattels after an assize of novel disseisin, contrary to Biancalana, 70 
Glanvill does not indicate that it is a writ of execution. Only after the 
sheriff has failed to obey the writ of execution would the plaintiff 
purchase the writ for restoring chattels;71 the fact that the sheriff had 
declined to restore the chattels indicates that there remained further 
problems. However, when the plaintiff in the justicies writ arrived 
in county court, he could well have been expected to have evidence 
of the court record of the assize of novel disseisin or at least of the 
writ of execution on which his justicies writ was based. Neither of 
these writs provides any basis for doubt about the thesis; only the 
writ of customs and services is a problem. 
Biancalana considers that Glanvill's commentary on the writ of 
customs and services decisively undercuts my thesis, because of the 
reference to the suit proceeding by the custom of the county. The 
problem is serious, but analysis of Glanvill offers only two alterna-
tives. The first is that the reasonable showing phrase only refers to 
65. /d. at 182, 210-11. 
66. Bianca1ana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1010-11. 
67. ld. at 1011. 
68. vii Tractatus de /egibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie qui Glanvilla vacatur, 
8 (81) (Hall ed. 1965) (hereinafter Glanvill). 
69. ld. 
70. Biancalana, Medievel County Courts, supra note 4, at 1010. 
71. Glanvill, supra note 68, at 170. 
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local custom. This was Biancalana's conclusion even though I had 
handled that possibility in the book. Chancery, however, could be 
very precise in referring to local custom as the relevant law. 72 More-
over, if the writ was not conferring special procedure but only man-
dating the application of local custom, there was no reason for plain-
tiffs to surrender so large a portion of their claim to purchase the 
writ. The other alternative in approaching Glanvill is to examine 
other possibilities of what he meant. In the book I mentioned four 
possibilities, the most likely of which is that handling the case ac-
cording to the custom of the county would apply to all matters 
except the preclusive power of the deed: the form of the count, the 
mesne process, the accustomed nature of the court and its judges, 
and the method of execution after judgment.73 None of these writs 
presents any serious problems for the thesis; the writs concerning 
testamentary divisions and restoration of chattels after an assize of 
novel disseisin certainly support it. 
Biancalana takes me to task for overlooking the possibility that 
the early justicies writs involving the archae cyrographorum were a 
possible influence on the origins of the viscontiel justicies writs. 74 
The archae was a collection of the written bonds that proved debts 
owed to Jews. That origin would help establish the relationship of 
the viscontiel justicies writs to specialty. I would agree, but I did not 
overlook the possibility. I examined the earliest justicies writs in the 
pipe rolls and concluded that they were special procedures for Jew-
ish plaintiffs in debt, not viscontiel debt writs. 75 Most of those were 
prior to the creation of the archae in 1194, but the presumption is 
72. Palmer, supra note I, at 210. 
73. Palmer, supra note I, at 210, n. 87. 
74. Biancalana also asserts that I did not pay much attention to the greed and 
oppression of sheriffs or the reason for the decline of the county courts. Biancalana, 
Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 995, 1002-03. In this he followed the lead, 
seemingly, of Stephen White, who commented "Palmer therefore concludes that 
while the viscontiel bureaucracy was hardly 'a faultless servant of the public inter-
est,' it was probably not 'as corrupt as the occasional virulent protest might indicates' 
(p. 55). One need not share Palmer's sunny view of medieval county bureauc-
racy .... "White, The Medieval English County Court (Book Review), 81 Mich. L. 
Rev. 963, %5 (1983). Unlike Helen Cam, Stephen White, and Biancalana, I do not 
believe that every allegation of misconduct is true; had the Hundred Rolls resulted in 
indictments, it must be expected that the majority of those accused, like the majority 
of those indicted for homicide, would legitimately have been acquitted. Few allega-
tions of misconduct appear in the plea rolls; for many of them, the sheriffs action was 
colorable. On the other hand, Stephen White did not mention, nor does Biancalana 
seem to see, that the heavily argued chapter on removal is based completely on the 
problems with sheriffs and bailiffs; the only way around those problems was limiting 
de facto county jurisdiction, causing the decline of the importance of the county court 
in the fourteenth century. I treated almost all the things Biancalana believes I 
ignored. 
75. Palmer, supra note I, at 184-85. 
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that this was a precursor. I explicitly related the Jewish chyrographs 
to the viscontiel justicies writs and specialty at the end of the treat-
ment of the reasonable showing clause. 76 
Nothing that Biancalana has to say on the subject of the 
justicies writ of debt holds up. His analysis is undercut by the as-
sumption that all county plaintiffs in debt were forced to buy 
justicies writs. That allowed him to hypothesize control and revenue 
motives, instead of inquiring about the reason why litigants would 
pay to have an optional writ. Moreover, he compartmentalized cer-
tain portions of the text out of the discussion, particularly that hav-
ing to do with the forty shilling rule, and did not examine Glanvill 
with sufficient care. The thesis on the justicies writs is not proven; a 
more explanatory thesis may surface. Until then, it must seem that 
the justicies writs were provided to keep debt/detinue and covenant 
suits out of the king's court, particularly when they involved few 
legal problems: the perception of the suit when plaintiff had 
specialty. 77 
III. Biancalana's Approach to the Covenant Rule 
Unpersuaded by the justicies debt material, Biancalana was 
understandably sceptical about my thesis on the origins of the spe-
cialty rule in covenant: both relied heavily on the construction of the 
reasonable showing clause in the justicies writs. He preferred to 
hypothesize that the specialty rule in covenant simply grew up in 
both county and king's court during the thirteenth century. 
On one point Biancalana is undeniably correct. The strongest 
direct evidence I adduced for mid-century practice relating justicies 
covenant directly to specialty came from the comparison between 
two cases in the Berkshire eyre of 1248. He points out, correctly, 
that I over-construed the justicies case. 78 The loss of that piece of 
evidence, however, does not defeat the thesis; it merely removes 
one piece of confirmatory evidence. What remains from the original 
data is what I consider a strong argument from the origins of the 
justicies writs as a class at the beginning of the thirteenth century, 
and a very strong argument about the reasonable showing clause late 
the thirteenth century. Evidence in between was desirable, but not 
necessary, since what was argued was continuity and what the plea 
rolls provide is a very uninformative record on the necessary points. 
Biancalana's approach to the covenant material must change, if 
he acknowledges the thesis in regard to justicies debt; the idea 
that the custom of a specialty requirement simply grew up along 
76. /d. at 211. 
77. Palmer, supra note I, at 214-15. 
78. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1013. 
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with growing literacy seems positively obscurantist. Moreover, 
Biancalana's hypothesis does not fit well with the analysis of 
Ibbetson's thesis. 
IV. Reasonable Showing 
At the time I wrote the book, I had four cases from the 1290s 
which used the words reasonable showing, all in reference to spe-
cialty. Two of these cases had originally been brought in county 
court by justicies writs of debt. The third had been brought in the 
court of King's Lynn. The fourth was a case probably but not surely 
removed from a lower court by pone. 79 All of the cases were in debt, 
whereas it would have been desirable to have evidence that the 
reasonable showing clause was similarly construed in covenant. The 
evidence nevertheless was strong enough to demonstrate the mean-
ing attached to the clause in the 1290s. Further evidence is now 
available that goes beyond what I had then. 
The evidence of the association between the reasonable show-
ing clause in debt litigation and specialty is now overwhelming. 
Prior of Barnwell v. B. was a claim of ten marks in which the 
defendant referred to the plaintiff's proffered writing as reasonable 
de monstrance. 80 Prioress of Westwood v. Prior to Malverne Parva 
is a case of debt for· twenty pounds in which the defendant twice 
referred to the proffered writing as renable demunstraunce. 81 De Ia 
Chape v. Anon. was a claim for fourteen marks in which the defen-
dant challenged a variance between count and the plaintiff's 
proferred writing, his resonable demonstrance. 82 Fitz Richard v. 
Richard, 83 Anon v. Anon, 84 A v. Executors of D, 85 R de P v. W. de 
M, 86 Executors of Steven de Bedeford v. Giffard, 87 and Lay v. Skel-
ton88 are further examples in which plaintiffs' proffered writings in 
actions of debt are termed resonable demonstraunce. None of these 
cases mention removal, so that it cannot be shown that they were 
actually brought originally by justicies writs and removed. Never-
theless, the frequency with which justicies writs were removed from 
79. Palmer, supra note I, at 200-202. 
80. British Library Add. MS. 35116 fol. 240. 
81. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 379 (1305?). 
82. British Library Add. MS. 35116 fv. 235. 
83. Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 188 fol. 17. 
84. Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 188 fv. 17. 
85. Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 188 fol. 18; Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. Misc. 87 fv. 31; 
British Library Add. 31826 fv. 67. 
86. Harvard MS. 162 fv. 197. 
87. British Library Add. MS. 37657 fv. 67. 
88. British Library Add. MS. 37657 fv. 122. 
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county courts in the 1290s together with the term itself make it 
probable that they were brought by justicies and removed by pone. 
There are now thirteen known cases of debt in which the term is 
used; each time it refers to specialty. 
In the book I was unable to adduce any proof that this usage 
extended beyond cases of debt; the assertion rested on the meaning 
of the common form of the justicies writs. Neumarch v. Thornton, 
however, is a case of covenant brought on a lease agreement that 
stipulated further that the lessee would return the manor in as good a 
condition as he found it, whereupon the lessee abated the house and 
trees. The plaintiff proffered specialty, appropriately since he was 
stipulating a special agreement beyond the mere lease. The defen-
dant then challenged a variance between the writ and count on the 
one hand and the renable demonstraunce on the other.89 Keyser v. 
Crescy is another covenant case. Lessor had leased to lessee two-
thirds of a manor, reserving the remaining third as dower for the 
widow, including a commitment to warrant the lessee against all 
men. The lessor then allowed the widow to recover her dower from 
the lessee and would not warrant him, contrary to the covenant. The 
lessee in court challenged a variance between the writ and the 
resnable demonstraunce. 90 The phrase referred to the writing, be-
cause the defendant immediately clarified his challenge by reference 
to le bref and then to le Jet. 91 The meaning of reasonable showing as 
related to specialty in the 1290s cannot be contested, whether for 
debt or covenant. 
One further indication of the relationship between reasonable 
showing and specialty comes from a yearbook note. 
Why will one not have detinet in a viscontiel writ of debt after 
the debet, as one has in a writ pleadable in Bench? The dam-
ages supposed derive from the detinet and are as well recovered 
by the one writ as by the other. According to some, it is because 
of the rationabiliter monstrare etc. which follows the debet and 
clarifies it. By others, it is because as soon as a man obliges 
himself by a writing he owes the debt, but he does not detain 
until the day passes. 92 
89. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 139. 
90. British Library Add. MS. 37657 fol. 30. 
91. /d. 
92. Pur quey en bref de dette vescantal si navera /em pas detinet apres /e debet 
sicam en brefpledable en banke. De pus qe damages qe supposez sunt par le detinet 
ausi bien estre recovere par /an bref cum par /autre. Secundum qaosdam, par le 
rationabiliter monstrare etc. qe ensyat qe esclarsist le debet etc. Et per qaosdam, a 
plus tot qe un home est oblige par escrist si deit ilia dette, mes il ne detent point tant 
qe /e ior seit passe. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 236. 
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Such yearbook notes are difficult, but one must try to make sense 
out of both the answers presented in the text. The first answer is that 
the phrase "as he shall reasonably have been able to show" clarifies 
the phrase "he owes," so that the specification about damages 
could come later. It is possible that this answer envisages the clarifi-
cation to come in the count, such that the reasonable showing would 
refer to making a good count. As an answer, this is unlikely but 
understandable, as I will show below. The second answer is better. I 
take the meaning to indicate a distinction between justicies debt and 
precipe debt, as supposed in the question. In justicies debt every-
thing flows from the writing, and thus only the debet is necessary. ln 
precipe debt, since the plaintiff did not need to have a writing, the 
detinet serves in place of the deed. A somewhat different under-
standing of the second answer would suppose thatjusticies debt was 
normally initiated close but prior to the date on which the debt was 
due, whereas a precipe writ of debt could only be purchased after 
the due date. Either explanation of the second answer, however, 
indicates that the plaintiff in justicies debt would have a writing. 
Just as interesting as the clear specialty requirement envisaged 
in the second answer is the implausible nature of the first answer. 
The implausibility, presuming that the clarification referred to would 
be in the count, is that this explanation would make the reasonable 
showing phrase superfluous. Precipe debt as well as justicies debt 
demanded a count that would clarify and expand on the writ. That 
necessity did not derive from any words in the writ. The answer 
would have been understandable, however, because counts began 
Ceo vous moustre. The first answer would nevertheless have re-
ceived some hearing because of the date at which the note was 
written. The manuscript in which the note appears could have been 
written as late as 1308 or 1309. The reasonable showing clause in 
justicies debt writs, however, was rendered meaningless by 1295. 
With the writs prohibiting county courts from entertaining debt/ 
detinue plaints for forty shillings or more, it became necessary for 
Chancery to issue justicies writs and for county courts to honor 
such writs even when the plaintiff did not have specialty. No longer 
was the primary fact in purchasing justicies debt writs whether or 
not one had specialty; it was whether the claim was for forty shil-
lings or more. If the claim exceeded forty shillings, one had to have a 
writ to plead in county; if it was less, one retained a choice as to 
whether to proceed by plaint or by writ. 
The debt forty shilling rule superseded the justicies debt spe-
cialty rule around 1290. The change was the reason why Biancalana 
was able to find in my citations a case brought by justicies in which 
the plaintiff did not have specialty: the case was brought in 1298, 
after the specialty rule in justicies debt had given way to the forty 
shilling rule. Biancalana concluded that the specialty rule was slow 
116 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL Of LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XXXI 
in developing;93 I conclude that the specialty rule in debt had already 
disappeared. Certain individuals, of course, would continue to refer 
to specialty as reasonable showing, but one could expect perplexity 
about the writ form in the early fourteenth century. 
In the book most of the analysis went to the rationabiliter in 
sicut rationabiliter monstrare poterit. I wanted to avoid any possi-
ble conclusion that specialty seemed particularly "rational." Equal 
attention, however, should be given to monstrare. Litigants never 
spoke about "showing" suit, but rather about "producing" suit. 
However, one did speak about showing deeds and tallies. 94 And, 
indeed, there is a case from 1241 by justicies writ in the county court 
of Buckinghamshire in which the plaintiff proved his debt by tally and 
suit, that is, by tally proved by the oath of six men. 95 Whether this 
was a sealed or unsealed tally is unknown. Since the debt for which 
the plaintiff was suing was assigned to him by the king, one can 
suspect the more formal sealed tally, which was roughly equivalent 
to specialty,96 and certainly something that could be "shown." As 
he shall reasonably have been able to show can on the force of the 
terms themselves be seen to indicate that some physical showing 
must be made: writing or, perhaps, a sealed tally. 
The reasoning proposed in the book for the origins of the spe-
cialty rule in covenant in king's court still seems good. The forty 
shilling rule in debt/detinue made the crucial phrase in justicies 
debt/detinue meaningless. Since those writs were far more common 
than covenant, that weakened the relationship in legal thought be-
tween the reasonable showing clause and specialty requirements. 
However, the forty shilling rule did not affect justicies covenant, 
which (by pone) was one if not the most frequent way of bringing 
litigious covenant cases into the king's court. Also, plaintiffs in 
those suits removed from county would still have had specialty, 
accustoming the justices to specialty in covenant. The juxtaposition 
of cases removed from county with precipe cases (which would not 
have required specialty) would produce the historical record that 
makes it look as if the law was ambivalent. Since the relationship 
between the writ and specialty became harder to perceive after the 
forty shilling rule appeared in debt, it is not surprising that justices 
93. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1012. 
94. Typical proffers of specialty are Veez sonfet or mist avant un escrist. A good 
example of the less common usage: Hou. Quey avez vous de Ia dette. Spigurnel. 
Siwte bone. Hott. Avez vous altre chose pur nous lier a Ia dette? Spigurnel. Nanyl. 
Hou. Sire, i1 nous demande une dette de x mars e.;/ ne moustre rien a Ia court pur 
nous /ier: escrist ne faille ne altre chose qe fur vaillefor lor vent. Harvard MS. 162 fv. 
190. J.H. Baker, Manual of Law French 144 (1979). 
95. 16 Curia Regis Rolls of the Reign of Henry lll 1700 (L.C. Hector, ed. 1979). 
96. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 360. 
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began associating covenant with specialty in a more jurisprudential 
fashion, identifying it, contrafactually ,97 with evidentiary problems. 
As stated in the book, "The specialty rule in covenant was thus 
philosophically grounded in evidence, but historically rooted in a 
misconception. " 98 Nothing in the lbbetson article or in the 
Biancalana reviews has weakened the argument. Hopefully, this 
response will clear the way for furthering understanding of legal 
change in thirteenth and fourteenth century England. 
97. There is no reason why covenant, like debt, could not have allowed for 
compurgation when plaintiff had no specialty. 
98. Palmer, supra note I, at 209. 
